The Kremlin has launched another spring offensive in Ukraine, focusing attacks in areas such as Sumy, yet this renewed effort hides an uncomfortable truth for Russia: it is running out of the tools needed to win. Despite sending wave after wave of soldiers, Russia’s once formidable war machine is crumbling under the weight of its own losses, depleted armour, and artillery failures.
Reports by military experts Jonathan Low and David Axe reveal that Russia’s chances of victory are dimming. According to Axe, Russia must occupy all of Luhansk and Donetsk to claim any form of success. Yet after more than three years of conflict, Russia has only managed to control around 20 percent of Ukraine, barely 2 percent more than it had after its initial 2022 push. That small gain has come at an extraordinary cost — over 935,000 Russian soldiers and more than 10,600 tanks and 22,000 armoured vehicles, according to Ukrainian figures.
Even conservative estimates from open-source tracker Oryx confirm over 20,000 Russian equipment losses since 2022. These include more than 2,600 tanks and 4,146 infantry fighting vehicles. Russian tank production sits at just 250 to 300 new units per year, while it loses approximately 866 tanks annually. This leaves a clear deficit.
| Equipment | Total Losses (Oryx) | Annual Production Capacity (est.) |
|---|---|---|
| Tanks | 2,600+ | 250–300 |
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles | 4,146 | 860 |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 1,903 | Unknown |
Russia once relied on Soviet-era stockpiles to sustain its war effort. However, these reserves are now dangerously low. Many of the remaining vehicles are in poor condition, requiring months to restore and often needing parts from multiple ruined tanks. As these leftovers are restored, each new unit takes longer and performs worse.
Desperation is evident in the battlefield. In April, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian “mechanised assault” using little more than motorcycles, converted civilian vehicles, and a handful of old armoured cars near Chasiv Yar. Gone are the days of coordinated tank-led charges. Russia is even deploying “reinforced” units with limited armour support, revealing a severe lack of protected mobility.
On the artillery front, Russia’s struggles are just as bleak. Once believed to hold a 5-to-1 artillery advantage, Moscow is now facing shortages in both artillery units and ammunition. The problem began in 2024, when Russia started cannibalising older guns just to keep barrels firing on the frontline.
As of 2025, the Russian military’s artillery fire rate has halved from 40,000 rounds per day to 23,000, due in part to targeted Ukrainian strikes on ammunition depots and drone-led sabotage campaigns.
| Artillery Type | Pre-War Stock | Now (est.) |
|---|---|---|
| Towed Artillery | 13,263 | 6,180 |
| Self-Propelled Artillery | 4,662 | 2,627 |
| Multiple Launch Rocket Sys. | 1,518 | Around 300 |
Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Ukrainian forces are now capable of deep strikes at over 1,050 miles (1,700 kilometres), which has drastically impacted Russia’s logistics and artillery stores.
On 28 March, Ukraine destroyed 122 Russian artillery pieces in a single day – the highest daily total since the war began. This steep loss, combined with diminishing production capacity, has left Russia’s military stretched, fragile, and incapable of sustaining large assaults. The artillery units that remain are in poor condition and are frequently exposed to Ukrainian counter-fire, drones, and minefields.
The tactics used by Russia are outdated, relying on brute force in a battlefield now ruled by precision strikes, defensive fortifications, and drone surveillance.
Experts conclude that the protected mechanised units Russia needs to win – tanks, infantry vehicles, artillery – are becoming “an endangered species.” Without these, there is no chance of regaining momentum, much less winning the war.
